Autism News Network
    
    
      Illinois Insurance Law update.
    
    Recent
        cases help define the Burden of proof / Standard of
      review
    March 2019: Wit v.
        United: Judge finds United applied financial criteria to deny
        mental health benefits when it created its own guidelines. Thus
        the judge ruled United's actions could be used to determine
        United breached its duty.
      
      April 1, 2018 Update: All ERISA employee benefit plans that
    condition a benefit upon a determination that a claimant is disabled
    must apply new rules as of April 1, 2018.
    A plan denying a claim must include the following protections:
    
      - a discussion of the decision, including an explanation of the
        basis for disagreeing with or not following: (1) the views
        presented by the claimant of health care and vocational
        professionals who treated or evaluated the claimant; (2) the
        views of medical or vocational experts whose advice was obtained
        on behalf of the plan in connection with a claimant's adverse
        benefit determination; and (3) a disability determination
        regarding the claimant made by the Social Security
        Administration; and
- either: (1) the specific internal rules, guidelines,
        protocols, standards or other similar criteria of the plan
        relied upon in making the adverse benefit determination; or (2)
        a statement that such rules, guidelines, etc. do not exist.
For initial claim denials, the notice must also include a
      statement that the claimant is entitled to receive, upon request
      and free of charge, reasonable access to and copies of all
      documents, records and other information relevant to the claim.
    For appeal denials, the notice must include a description of any
      plan-specific limitations period that applies to the claimant's
      right to bring a civil action, including the calendar date on
      which the contractual limitations period expires for the claim.
    These requirements do not apply just to  those plans 
      providing long-term or short-term disability benefits, but to any
      decision affecting benefits where disability is a consideration,
      for example,
    
      - group health plans providing coverage beyond age 26 for adult
        children who are disabled;
- life insurance plans providing a premium waiver for
        participants who are totally disabled; or
- deferred compensation plans providing special provisions for
        disabled participants, such as accelerated vesting or early
        retirement options.
 
    Burden
        of proof / Standard of review
    In insurance litigation, the outcome often depends on which party
    has the burden of proof and which party has the right to interpret
    the written terms of the plan and the meaning of the medical
    evidence presented by the patient.  However, recent cases have
    made the task more difficult.
    
    During 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
    discussed the deference a plan must give to a treating physician's
    opinion against a health plan's witness. The current rule is that
    the plan is not required to give the doctor who actually treats your
    child deference (a presumption that the treating physician's opinion
    is the best).  Black & Decker Disability Plan
        v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003)  (pdf) 
More
    recent cases state however that he treating physician may have
    better information than the plan's doctor, and a plan cannot refuse
    to consider the treating physician's opinion. In Hawkins, the 7th
      Circuit overruled a plan which relied on mere scraps of evidence
      to counter a treating physician's evidence.   Hawkins v. First
        Union Corporation Long-term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914
      (7th Cir. 2003); see Govindarajan v.
        FMC Corp., 932 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
      that a selective review of medical evidence and a conclusion based
      on that selectivity was unreasonable).  "Deferential review
      is not no review." Hess v. Hartford Ins Co., 274
      F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001).  (See also Elliott v. Metro Life Ins. Co. 
(6th
      Cir. 2006): "Logically, MetLife could have made a reasoned
      judgment only if it relied on medical evidence that assessed
      Elliott’s physical ability to perform job-related tasks. McDonald, 347 F.3d at 172
      (citing Quinn v. Blue Cross
        & Blue Shield Ass’n, 161 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir.
      1998) (The plan “was under a duty to make a reasonable inquiry
      into the types of skills [the claimant] possesses and whether
      those skills may be used at another job.”)).
    
      A 2006 opinion by a Federal New York court also reflects some ot
      the earlier reasoning of the Seventh Circuit with a thorough
      analysis of the advantages the treating physician has over the
      reviewing physician in evaluating a patient's condition. For
      psychiatric cases, an important aspect of the assessment of the
      patient's condition comes from observation of the patient's
      demeanor, watching affect, evaluating nuances of speech, etc.
      These types of factors, and there are many of them, simply cannot
      be recorded in written medical records. In addition, the ethics
      code of the American Psychiatric Association prohibits a doctor
      from offering a professional opinion unless he or she has examined
      the patient. In Westphal the
      court determined that the plan-insurer acted in an arbitrary and
      capricious manner by relying on the opinions of non-treating,
      non-examining doctors to override the prescription of care offered
      by the treating physician. This rationale of this opinion could go
      a long way toward tipping relatively balanced scales in close
      cases in the provider's and patient's favor.  Westphal v. Eastman Kodak Co,
      2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41494 (June 21, 2006, WD NY).
      
    In Mondry
      v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., (W.D. Wisc., Nov. 21,
    2006) the Plan and Cigna six times stonewalled the participant's
    efforts to obtain the written plan documents determining when the
    Plan would cover speech therapy.    Only after
    lawyers were involved did the plan provide the documents and reverse
    its denial of the service, which it had initially denied under the
    habilitation guise.   
    
    Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that the claims determination must be a
      deliberate, reasoned process.  Elliott v. Metro Life Ins. Co. 
(6th
      Cir. 2006).
      
    March 6, 2009: The 7th Circuit Court of
      Appeals reviewed Mondry,
      writing
    
    In particular,
        nothing in the SPD suggests that  therapy must be “restorative” in order to qualify as
      “medically necessary.” In short, CIGNA
        had been relying on [its internal
        criteria manuals] as the equivalent of plan language, treating the former documents as if they were
        dispositive and citing them to
        Mondry as such.... 
    
    Because Cigna relied on the documents, ERISA required
      the Plan to produce them.  The wrinkle was that while Cigna
      had these secret documents, American Family was the Plan, and it
      was the Plan's duty, and not Cigna's to deliver the
      documents.  The court found the Plan liable for statutory
      penalties for not delivering the documents, suggesting that the
      Plan should have forced its claims administrator, Cigna, to
      deliver the documents which showed Cigna's position was wrong.
      While the documents eventually helped Mondry recover the cost of
      the speech therapy. the deliver came too late for her to elect
      COBRA coverage.  Since Cigna misrepresented that speech
      therapy was not covered, Mondry did not continue the
      coverage.  The court ruled that ERISA did not provide a
      remedy for this injury, and that topic is beyond the scope of this
      article.
        Mondry-7thCir.pdf 
    
      The Seventh Circuit reversed another claims denial:
    Because the Plan's determination
      failed to consider Ms. Leger's complete medical history and
      rejected, without
      explanation, important aspects of the [Functional Capacity
      Evaluation], we believe that the Plan acted in an arbitrary and
      capricious manner in terminating Ms. Leger's benefits.
    
    Leger v. Tribune Company Long Term
      Disability Plan, March 9, 2009.
    
    A new case, Bard
v.
      Boston Shipping Assoc., ___ F.3d. ___, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
    31137 (1st Cir. 2006) focuses on a variety of violations of ERISA’s
    claims procedure requirements by a multiemployer trust fund:
    
      - the trust fund failed to give Bard proper notice of the
        initial denial of his claim.
- the fund violated the claims procedure requirements when it
        allowed the same individual review Bard’s appeal as had
        originally evaluated and denied Bard’s claim review.
- the fund failed to comply with the time limits outlined in the
        claim procedure regulations for making a decision on Bard’s
        appeal and notifying him of that decision.
- the trust fund failed to consult an appropriate medical expert
        when reviewing Bard’s claim.
- the trust fund unreasonably refused to take into account
        updated medical records submitted by Bard’s treating physicians.
The court in Bard
    summarized the patient's predicament: "Bard is in a similar
    position: because of the Plan's failures to give proper notice, he
    did not learn about the Plan's interpretation until it was too late.
    By the time the Plan's interpretation was made clear to him, he was
    forced to argue his case to a Board that lacked the requisite
    objectivity, and that used his earlier submissions against him.
    Additionally, as in Glista, the defendant plan has "offered
    no explanation for why it did not explain earlier" its basis for the
    initial adverse benefit determination.  ...Accordingly, we
    grant relief similar to what we ordered in Glista. Thus we
    bar the defendant plan from using Bard's earlier medical evidence
    against him. In so doing, we essentially undo the prejudice that
    resulted from Bard's reliance on his initial reasonable
    interpretation of the Plan."
    
    In a Feb.27, 2007, case, left unpublished, by the Eleventh Circuit
    criticized Aetna's denial of claims (Helms v. General Dynamics Corp):
    Aetna's myopic and
        flawed reasoning and its procedural failures to properly inform
        Helms of the specific reasons for his denial in a timely
        fashion, coupled with the lack of an [Independent Medical Exam]
        IME of an admittedly subjective condition, is arbitrary and
        capricious. ... there
          was no evidence other than that of Helms's treating physician
          Dr. Epperson and Helms himself. Put another way, this is not a
          case wherein the plan administrator refused to credit the
          opinions of doctors that supported disability but instead
          accorded greater weight to conflicting opinions of doctors
          that did not support disability. See, e.g., Wangenstein,
          [unpublished case]... (upholding a plan administrator's
          weighing of multiple neurologists' examinations and reviews
          but ultimately crediting neurologists that did not support a
          finding of disability). With only Dr. Epperson's medical
          evaluation in the form of his office notes, test results,
          APSs, and narratives, Aetna excised narrow snippets of Dr.
          Epperson's notes, while it discredited or ignored whole tracts
          of his medical evaluation that supported Helms's STD claim,
          all without a peer review or an IME. Aetna's review in this
          case was malignant at worst, and arbitrary at best. See Nord, 538 U.S. at 834,
          123 S.Ct. at 1972 ("plan administrators ... may not
          arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant's reliable evidence,
          including the opinions of a treating physician.").
    
    Helms-Aetna
    
    The Seventh Circuit, however, is going in a different direction in
    2006-07.  The Seventh Circuit's rulings would direct ERISA
    cases arising out of Illinois, Wisconsin and Indiana.  In Davis v. Unun Life Ins. Co.,
    444 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2006), the Court ignored the above cases and
    overturned a district court, saying: 
    The district court
        and Davis also fault Unum for relying on "a mere paper review,"
        lamenting the fact that Unum's doctors did not personally
        examine Davis or speak with his doctors. However, neither the
        district court nor Davis has cited, and our research has not
        disclosed, any authority that generally prohibits the
        commonplace practice of doctors arriving at professional
        opinions after reviewing medical files. In such file reviews,
        doctors are fully able to evaluate medical information, balance
        the objective data against the subjective opinions of the
        treating physicians, and render an expert opinion without direct
        consultation. It is reasonable, therefore, for an administrator
        to rely on its doctors' assessments of the file and to save the
        plan the financial burden of conducting repetitive tests and
        examinations.
    
    and citing Dougherty v. Indiana
      Bell Telephone Co., 440 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2006):
     "We will
        uphold a benefit decision so long as that decision has "rational
        support in the record." Leipzig,
        362 F.3d at 409. " 'Questions of judgment are left to the plan
        administrator,' and 'it is not our function to decide whether we
        would reach the same conclusion' as the administrator." Sisto, 429 F.3d at 701
        [cites]. Put simply,
          a decision will not be overturned unless it is "downright
          unreasonable." 
    
    Finally. the Seventh Circuit backtracked a little, by saying the
    abuse of discretion standard was not an absolute win for a plan, in
    Call v. Ameritech Management
      Pension Plan (Jan 9, 2007):
     But "we have said
        many times that the term 'abuse of discretion' covers a range of
        degrees of deference rather than denoting a point within that
        range, and where a particular case falls in the range depends on
        the precise character of the ruling being reviewed." 
       It is true that the plan administrator,
        who is given discretion to interpret the plan, adopted the
        interpretation that the defendant is urging upon us; to reject
        his interpretation we must find an abuse of that discretion. But
        "we have said many times that the term 'abuse of discretion'
        covers a range of degrees of deference rather than denoting a
        point within that range, and where a particular case falls in
        the range depends on the precise character of the ruling being
        reviewed."  The
        deference   that we would normally give to an
        interpretation by the administrator of a pension plan, [cite],
        is overridden in this case by the lack of any reasoned basis for
        that interpretation.  Deference is
        relative to the nature of the issues, including their
        complexity. [cite] The more complex, the greater the range of
        reasonable resolutions. In addition, "Deference depends on
        ambiguity." [cite]. The points are related. The more numerous and imponderable
          the factors  bearing on a decision, the harder it will be
          for a reviewing court to pronounce the decision unreasonable
          and hence an abuse of discretion. But the
        interpretation of written contracts in cases in which no
        extrinsic evidence (that is, no evidence--besides the contract
        itself) is presented is usually pretty straightforward. There
        are the contract's wording, some commonsensical principles of
        interpretation, and the commercial or other background of the
        contract insofar as that can be gleaned without taking evidence.
        When guides to meaning line up on one side of the case, as they
        do here, an adjudicator who decides the case the other way is
        likely to be acting unreasonably.
    
    
    Also, given Leger, above,
    even the Seventh Circuit will hold the plan fidciaries up to their
    duty to review thoroughly the evidence presented to them.
    Since medical claims, especially those involving autism, are more
    complex than the interpretation of documents, this sliding scale of
    deference tilts towards the plan and not the patient.
    
2015 Update:  Discretionary
      standard does not apply to Illinois Insured Plans
    Illinois insurance regulations state:
    No policy, contract, certificate, endorsement, rider
      application or agreement offered or issued in this State, by a
      health carrier, to provide, deliver, arrange for, pay for or
      reimburse any of the costs of health care services or of a
      disability may contain a provision purporting to reserve
      discretion to the health carrier to interpret the terms of the
      contract, or to provide standards of interpretation or review that
      are inconsistent with the laws of this State.
    
    In other words, an insurance policy in Illinois may not contain a
    discretionary clause. The Seventh Circuit Court of appeals applied
    this prohibition to a claim for benefits under an ERISA plan. 
    Fontaine v. Met Life, 800 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2015).  The
    employer's plan could not use the discretionary clause to deny
    benefits.  The Illinois regulation, as an insurance law, was
    saved from preemption.  However, this decision will probably
    not apply to an employer which self-funds its benefit plan, since
    self-funded plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies.
    
    2007 Update: 
    The Third Circuit issues a sweeping
        ruling that sets out a new framework for how judges should decide cases where the
        benefit determinator has a conflict of interest, but still tough
        going in the Seventh Circuit.
    
    
    http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054927p.pdf
    
    Excerpts from the Court's
      opinion:
    ERISA does not specify the standard of review that a trial court
    should apply in an action for wrongful denial of benefits.
     In Firestone Tire
        & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989), the
      Supreme Court held that the default standard of review in all §
      1132(a)(1)(B) cases is de novo. The Court noted in a dictum that
      when a plan by its terms gives the administrator discretion, which
      the plan at issue in Firestone did not, the administrator’s
      decisions are upheld unless they abuse that discretion. Id. at
      115. On the issue of conflicts of interest, the Court noted that
      “if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or
      fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that
      conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in determining whether
      there is an abuse of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Restatement
      (Second) of Trusts § 187 cmt. d (1959)). Addressing conflicts of
      interest in the post-Firestone era, most courts of appeals have
      adopted a “sliding scale” standard of review. This approach grants
      the administrator deference in accordance with the level of
      conflict. Thus, if the level of conflict is slight, most of the
      administrator’s deference remains
      intact, and the court applies something similar to traditional
      arbitrary and capricious review; conversely, if the level of
      conflict is high, then most of its discretion is stripped away.
      Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th
      Cir. 1993).
    
    
     In Judge Becker’s scholarly opinion in Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life
        Insurance Co., 214 F.3d 377, 392 (3d Cir. 2000), we cast
      our lot with the sliding scale approach. Among the eleven courts
      of appeals that have reported decisions in this area, six have
      adopted some version of the sliding scale.4 Id.;Vega v. Nat’l Life
      Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc);
      Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1161–62 (8th Cir. 1998);
      Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir.
      1997); Doe, 3 F.3d at 87; Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d
      979, 984 (6th Cir. 1991). In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court of
      Appeals follows a “substantially similar” approach, though it
      rejects the sliding-scale metaphor. Abatie v. Alta Health &
      Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
      (choosing simply to note that “[a] district court, whenfaced with
      all the facts and circumstances, must decide in each case how much
      or how little to credit the plan administrator's reason for
      denying insurance coverage”). In Pinto, we held that the sliding
      scale approach was most faithful to Firestone’s command that the
      level of conflict be considered as a factor in shaping arbitrary
      and capricious review. 214 F.3d at 392.
    
    
    B. Contours of the Sliding Scale The premise of the sliding scale
    approach is that courts should examine benefit denials on their
    facts to determine whether the administrator abused its discretion.
    Id. at 391. To apply the approach, courts first consider the
    evidence that the administrator acted from an improper motive and
    heighten their level of scrutiny appropriately. Id. at 392. Second,
    they review the merits of the decision and the evidence of
    impropriety together to determine whether the administrator properly
    exercised the discretion accorded it. Id. at 394. If so, its
    decision stands; if not, the court steps into the shoes of the
    administrator and rules on the merits itself. At its best, the
    sliding scale reduces to making a common-sense decision based on the
    evidence whether the administrator appropriately exercised its
    discretion. This theme, rather than getting bogged down in trying to
    find the perfect point on the sliding scale, should be district
    courts’ touchstone.
    
    In sharp disagreement, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    holds that it is improper to label those situations “conflicts of
    interest.” See Rud v. Liberty
      Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 438 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir 2006)
    (Posner, J.). The problem, it argues, is that we generally assume
    that parties to a contract are self-interested, and it is inimical
    to the law of contracts to confuse self-interest with a conflict of
    interest. Id. This is no doubt logical, yet the Supreme Court has
    held that ERISA places us in the realm of trust law, not contract
    law. Firestone, 489 U.S.
    at 110–11. Moreover, were we to apply contract law, we would review
    plans de novo from the start, for there is no analog to fiduciary
    discretion in the common law of contracts. But we are not, and our
    position, in strict accordance with Supreme Court precedent, follows
    the common law of trusts.
    
    2008 starts with more confusion between the circuits
    
    Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, — F.3d —-, (C.A.4 (S.C.)) (January 8, 2008)
    ". . . the district court, faced
      with substantial conflicting medical
      evidence and a good case on both sides, concluded that Evans’s
      position
      was the stronger one. But Eaton was entitled to an abuse of
      discretion
      standard of review, and the district court’s judgment, though
      abuse of
      discretion in name, was de novo in fact. . . . But the delicate
      balance
      persists. The district court lost sight of this balance. We
      therefore
      reverse the district court’s award of benefits to Evans and remand
      with
      directions that judgment be granted to Eaton."
    
    
    Saffon v. Wells Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, — F.3d —-, (C.A.9 (Cal.)) (January 9, 2008)
    As we read Abatie, when reviewing a discretionary denial of
      benefits by a
      plan administrator who is subject to a conflict of interest, we
      must
      determine the extent to which the conflict influenced the
      administrator’s
      decision and discount to that extent the deference we accord the
      administrator’s decision. In so doing, we seek to overcome the
      “serious …
      danger of conflicted plan decisionmaking” illustrated by the Unum Provident scandal. Langbein, supra, at 1335.
      
      In Abatie, we explained
      that a reviewing court must always consider the
      “inherent conflict that exists when a plan administrator both
      administers
      the plan and funds it.” Id. at 967. We “weigh” such a conflict
      more or
      less “heavily” depending on what other evidence is available. Id.
      at 968.
      
      We “view[ ]” the conflict with a “low” “level of skepticism” if
      there’s no
      evidence “of malice, of self-dealing, or of a parsimonious
      claims-granting
      history.” Id. But we may “weigh” the conflict “more heavily” if
      there’s
      evidence that the administrator has given “inconsistent reasons
      for
      denial,” has failed “adequately to investigate a claim or ask the
      plaintiff for necessary evidence,” or has “repeatedly denied
      benefits to
      deserving participants by interpreting plan terms incorrectly.”
      Id.
      
      In explaining what it means to “weigh” a conflict of interest, Abatie
      “conscious[ly]” rejected the “sliding scale” approach adopted by
      other
      circuits:
      
      [W]eighing a conflict of interest as a factor in abuse of
      discretion
      review requires a case-by-case balance …. A district court, when
      faced
      with all the facts and circumstances, must decide in each case how
      much or
      how little to credit the plan administrator’s reason for denying
      insurance
      coverage. An egregious conflict may weigh more heavily (that is,
      may cause
      the court to find an abuse of discretion more readily) than a
      minor,
      technical conflict might.
    
    
Doyle v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, — F.3d —-, (C.A.11 (Fla.)) (January 7, 2008)
“applying a burden shifting analysis to a claims administrator’s
factual determinations poses unique difficulties.”
    
    
2016 update: Ninth Circuit amends
      burden of proof standard when there is unequal access to
      information
    As noted above, a plaintiff usually bears the burden of proving his
    or her claim for benefits.  I Estate of Barton v. ADT
      Secutrity Services Pension Plan, 820 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.
    2016),When Barton retired at age 65, ADT said it could not find his
    employment records and denied his pension benefits.  Barton
    produced employment records, but only the employer could produce the
    eligibility records.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
    that where a claimant makes a prima facie case that he is
    entitled to benefits but lacks key information about corporate
    structure or the hours he worked necessary to substantiate a claim
    for benefits, but the employer controls the information, then the
    burden of proof shifts to the defendant to produce the information.
    
    
In 2008, look for the Supreme
    Court to accept a case to resolve the differences between the
    approaches taken by the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
    
    Court rules that a plan's guidelines do not have to be revealed
      when they are not used by the insurer.
    The court in Brooks
    decided whether an insurer's claims management guidelines should
    have been provided to an ERISA plan participant who unsuccessfully
    appealed the insurer's termination of her disability benefits. Under
    the claims procedure
    regulations, plan participants and beneficiaries have a right to
    receive copies of "relevant" documents when appealing a denied
    claim. The participant Brooks argued that the guidelines were
    relevant within the meaning of the regulations because they were
    either (1) relied on in making the benefit determination or
    considered in the course of the determination, or (2) demonstrated
    compliance with
    administrative processes and safeguards required under the
    regulations. The insurer countered that it had not considered the
    guidelines when it review the participant's appeal, and that, as a
    matter of practice, any reference to the guidelines would have been
    specifically noted in the participant's claim file. The court agreed
    with the insurer, based on the evidence submitted by the insurer,
    that since the guidelines were not considered in any way in the
    course of the appeal, the insurer did not have to produce them to
    the participant.  This insurer avoided having to provide its
    guidelines only because there was clear evidence that they were not
    implicated in any way with this particular appeal. Other plans may
    attempt to obtain the same result by adopting a procedure which
    requires adding a note to the claim file when guidelines were
    consulted. However, as the court acknowledged, other court cases
    have read the relevant document rule differently and might require
    production of this kind of guideline as a general rule. 
    
    The Court stated:
    Brooks also asserts that the CMG is
      relevant because it demonstrates compliance with the
      administrative processes and safeguards that plans must adopt
      pursuant to ERISA's implementing regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 
2650.503-1(m)(8)(iii); Id.
      §2560.503-1(b)(5).
      Brooks reads the regulations too broadly. The Department of Labor
      (DOL) has made clear that the disclosure requirement Brooks seeks
      to invoke is limited to materials specifically generated
      connection with a particular adverse benefit determination:
      "[S]ubparagraph (m)(8)(iii) provides that, among the information
      that a plan must provide a claimant... is any information that the
      plan has generated or obtained in the process of ensuring and
      verifying that, in making the particular determination, the plan
      complied with its own administrative processes and safeguards[.]"
      26 Fed.Reg. at 70,252. (Emphasis supplied). See also 
Palmiotti v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
        Co., 2006 WL 510387 (S.D.N.Y.).
    
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions152/Opinions/Brooks100907.pdf
    
    
    2560.503-1  Claims procedure.
    (h)(2) Full and fair review. Except as provided in paragraphs (h)(3) 
and (h)(4) of this section, the claims procedures of a plan will not be 
deemed to provide a claimant with a reasonable opportunity for a full 
and fair review of a claim and adverse benefit determination unless the 
claims procedures--
    (i) Provide claimants at least 60 days following receipt of a 
notification of an adverse benefit determination within which to appeal 
the determination;
    (ii) Provide claimants the opportunity to submit written comments, 
documents, records, and other information relating to the claim for 
benefits;
    (iii) Provide that a claimant shall be provided, upon request and 
free of charge, reasonable access to, and copies of, all documents, 
records, and other information relevant to the claimant's claim for 
benefits. Whether a document, record, or other information is relevant 
to a claim for benefits shall be determined by reference to paragraph 
(m)(8) of this section;
(m)(8) A document, record, or other information shall be considered 
``relevant'' to a claimant's claim if such document, record, or other information
    (i) Was relied upon in making the benefit determination;
    (ii) Was submitted, considered, or generated in the course of making 
the benefit determination, without regard to whether such document, 
record, or other information was relied upon in making the benefit 
determination;
    (iii) Demonstrates compliance with the administrative processes and 
safeguards required pursuant to paragraph (b)(5) of this section in 
making the benefit determination; or
    (iv) In the case of a group health plan or a plan providing 
disability benefits, constitutes a statement of policy or guidance with 
respect to the plan concerning the denied treatment option or benefit 
for the claimant's diagnosis, without regard to whether such advice or 
statement was relied upon in making the benefit determination.
    
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